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in the substantive or procedural law was squarely presented in
State v. Williams.73 In that case the accused was charged with
manslaughter committed on June 5, 1948, and was brought to
trial on March 29, 1949. If the responsive verdict statute affected
substantive rights it would not be applicable to defendant's crime,
which had been committed before its effective date. If it was
procedural in nature, it should govern the defendant's trial in
1949. The trial judge had applied the new statute and had
charged the jury that the only appropriate verdicts were guilty
or not guilty. Defense counsel had unsuccessfully urged the
judge to include attempted manslaughter and negligent homi-
cide in his statement of the possible verdicts. Justice Frug6 again
wrote the opinion for a unanimous court. In upholding the trial
judge's charge pursuant to the new act, the supreme court
squarely held that the change effected by the responsive verdict
statute was upon the procedural rather than the substantive
law.
In a way, it may prove helpful, in future cases involving the
validity of amendments of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that
Judge Frug6 chose to posit the Simpson case decision upon the
broad ground of recognizing a proper limitation upon the supreme
court's prior holding in the Rodosta case. A complete separation
of substantive and procedural laws is frequently impractical,
even impossible. It would be quite unfortunate if amendments
of the Code of Criminal Procedure were to be subject to chal-
lenge if they partook somewhat of substantive criminal law prin-
ciples. Similarly, amendments of the Criminal Code may often
overlap related principles of procedural law. Judge Frug6's brief
handling of this question should establish a sound guiding prin-
ciple when other similar technical objections may be raised to
the constitutionality of future legislation which may necessarily
partake somewhat of both substantive and procedural law.
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Amendment of petition. The difficult problem concerning
the right of a plaintiff to amend his petition after the issue has
been joined by the filing of an answer was again presented in
73. 216 La. 419, 43 So. 2d 780 (1949).
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Holley v. Butler Furniture Company.' The plaintiff sued for
damages caused to the automobile he was driving when it collided
with defendant's truck. Although he had alleged ownership of
the automobile, it developed during the trial that the plaintiff
neither owned the car nor had he paid for the repairs made to it,
whereupon the defendants filed an exception of no right of
action. While the court had this exception under consideration
and before judgment thereon, the plaintiff filed an amended peti-
tion alleging a verbal mandate from his father, the real owner
of the car, to recover the damages in question. Simultaneously,
the father also filed a petition of intervention alleging ownership
of the car, reiterating the plaintiff's allegations in the supple-
mental petition, and in the alternative, praying for judgment in
his favor as the real owner of the car. The lower court sustained
the exception, denied the right of plaintiff to amend, and dis-
missed the intervention. This judgment was affirmed by the
court of appeal, and on a writ of review the supreme court cor-
rectly held (1) that under Article 15 of the Code of Practice,
the plaintiff had no interest in the suit and therefore the excep-
tion of no right of action was correctly sustained; (2) that, under
the rule that an intervention falls or stands with the main de-
mand, the lower court had properly dismissed the petition of the
intervener; and (3) that the plaintiff had no right to amend 2 the
petition since the amendment changed the substance of the de-
mand in contravention of Article 419 of the Code of Practice.3
Call in warranty. As a general rule, in an action for trespass,
a call in warranty is not permissible because the defendant is
bound to answer for his own wrong and cannot call on a war-
rantor to assist him in his attempt to escape liability.4 However,
where the defendant denies the trespass and by way of defense
1. 217 La. 8, 45 So. 2d 747 (1950).
2. The court said inter alia "[the plaintiff's allegation] that he had an
oral mandate, we think, as did the Court of Appeal, was an afterthought-an
attempt by the plaintiff to bolster up his petition." Holley v. Butler Furniture
Co., 45 So. 2d 747, 748 (La. 1950). Be this as it may, unless the record showed
that the amended petition was an "afterthought," the court was not in a
position to assume it as a fact.
3. It is well recognized that a petition may be amended at any time
before issue is joined without leave of court. Tremont Lumber Co. v. May,
143 La. 389, 78 So. 650 (1918); Thomas v. Leonard Truck Lines, 7 So. 2d 753
(La. App. 1942). After issue is joined, the recent trend is to permit an amend-
ment in the discretion of the court, provided, however, that it does not
change the substance of the demand. Art. 419, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
Rials v. Davis, 212 La. 161, 31 So. 2d 726 (1947). See also Seale v. Stephens,
210 La. 1068, 29 So. 2d 65 (1946), wherein the cause was remanded with
Instructions to permit an amendment even though it was offered after the
trial had begun.
4. Bossier's Heirs v. Jackson, 114 La. 707, 38 So. 525 (1905).
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alleges ownership of the property, the defendant has the right to
call his vendor in warranty. This important distinction was made
in the cases of Blanchard v. Norman-Breaux Lumber Company5
and Dalton v. Norman-Breaux Lumber Company.6
Damages. The principle that attorney fees are not an element
of damages for which recovery may be had, in the absence of
statute or contract, is well established as a general proposition.
Not so, however, when attorney fees are claimed as damages in
a possessory action. The supreme court and the courts of appeal
adhere to opposite rules.7 In Efner v. Ketteringham,8 the supreme
court missed an opportunity to settle the conflict, preferring to
follow a recent decision9 in which it was held that attorney fees
would not be allowed where the plaintiff had not offered suffi-
cient proof to establish his claim.10
Nullity of judgment. In Adams v. Peilloux," the court
points out that although a judgment obtained through ill prac-
tices on the part of the party in whose favor it was rendered may
be annulled at the instance of the party aggrieved,' 2 the evidence
of artifice, deception, or fraud, must be clear and unambiguous.
In this case, the court found that the mere fact that defendant's
attorney was under the impression that a judgment by default
would not. be taken and that the plaintiff's attorney had secured
the services of another attorney to take and confirm the default
was not sufficient to show ill practices on the part of the plaintiff.
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The question of determining the amount in dispute for the
purpose of appellate jurisdiction continues to be a difficult prob-
lem which cannot always be solved by the application of the basic
general rules often reaffirmed by the court. As a general propo-
sition, jurisdictional amount is to be determined, not by the
amount of the judgment appealed from, but by the amount in
dispute at the time the case is submitted to the trial court for
decision.'5 Moreover, the record must affirmatively show that the
5. 216 La. 551, 44 So. 2d 112 (1950).
6. 216 La. 559, 44 So. 2d 114 (1950).
7. Cf. Cooper v. Cappel, 29 La. Ann. 213 (1877); Williams v. Harmanson,
41 La. Ann. 702, 6 So. 604 (1889), and Bryson v. George, 31 So. 2d 492 (La. App.
,1947).
8. 47 So. 2d 331 (La. 1950).
9. Rhodes v. Collier, 215 La. 754, 41 So. 2d 669 (1949).
10. 47 So. 2d 331, 332 (La. 1950).
11. 216 La. 566, 44 So. 2d 117 (1950).
12. Art. 607, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
13. Kennedy v. Perry Timber Co., 217 La. 401, 46 So. 2d 312 (1950).
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court has appellate jurisdiction,'14 and neither the stipulation of
counsel nor the affidavit of the appellant that the amount in dis-
pute is over the required $2000 will suffice.15 In such cases, the
court will transfer the appeal to the proper court rather than
dismiss it altogether 6 However, it is not often an easy matter
to determine what the "amount involved" really is, since it is not
always that the amount which the plaintiff stands to gain is
equal to what the defendant stands to lose. In many instances,
therefore, the court has had to resort to what has been called "the
defendant's viewpoint theory" as the test for jurisdictional
amount. 1'7
In cases of executory proceedings to foreclose a mortgage or
to enforce a judgment, the rule seems to have been established
that where the debtor enjoined the seizure and sale of the prop-
erty, the test of appellate jurisdiction was the amount of the debt
or of the judgment, but where a third person enjoined the seizure,
the value of the property governed the jurisdiction of the court.'
In Cannella v. Succession of Cannella,0 the supreme court
pointed out the fallacy of this rule, holding that the injunction
proceedings, whether instituted by the debtor or by a third per-
son claiming ownership of the property, are merely incidental
to the main demand, and that under the constitutional provi-
sions, 20 where there is an appeal from a reconventional or other
incidental demand, the appeal lies to the court having jurisdiction
of the main demand. The effect of the Cannella case is, therefore,
to overrule the prior jurisprudence as announced in the Lhote
case and the authorities therein cited.2'
14. Succession of Rouen, 216 La. 957, 45 So. 2d 91 (1950).
15. Fontenot v. Babineaux, 47 So. 2d 678 (La. 1950); Thalheim v. Gruhler,
216 La. 502, 43 So. 2d 907 (1949).
16. La. R.S. (1950) 13:4441; Nash v. Curette, 216 La. 190, 43 So. 2d 262
(1949).
17. For cases illustrative of the application of this rule, see The Work of
the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1948-1949 Term, 10 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 120, 124, note 18 (1950).
18. Lhote & Company v. Church Extension Society, 115 La. 487, 39 So. 502
(1905); Tremont Lumber Co. v. Talbot, 140 La. 887, 74 So. 183 (1917); Louisi-
ana Western Lumber Co. v. Stanford, 178 La. 1052, 152 So. 755 (1934).
19. 216 La. 464, 43 So. 2d 795 (1949).
20. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 1.
21. In the course of its opinion, the court states: "For example, it was
declared in Lhote & Co. v. Church Extension Society . . . that where a judg-
ment debtor enjoins the execution, the test of jurisdiction is the amount of
the judgment . . . but that if a third person enjoins . . . jurisdiction is gov-
erned by the value of the property .... But in making this observation . ..
the court failed to give consideration to the provisions of Section 1 of Article
VII of the Constitution. In reality, the statements hark back to early deci-
sions which were handed down long before the appellate jurisdictional clause
... had been placed in our organic law." Cannella v. Suc. of Cannella, 216 La.
464, 470, 43 So. 2d 795, 797 (1949).
1951]
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Another interesting point arose in the cases of Breland v.
City of Bogalusa22 and Mouton v. City of Lafayette.23 These cases
involved the validity of municipal ordinances expanding the
corporate limits of the municipalities involved. The court an-
nounced the established principle that where the litigation in-
volves solely a contested civil or political right which cannot be
specifically valued, the supreme court is without jurisdiction.
Although the court could have very appropriately rested its deci-
sion on this principle, it went further in assuming that the right
involved was susceptible of evaluation and could be gauged by
the amount of taxes the contestants would have to pay, or by
the total amount of revenues which the respective municipalities
expected to collect from the area to be incorporated. On further
examination, however, the court found these values fell short of
the necessary jurisdictional amount and accordingly ordered the
cases transferred to the court of appeal.
24
Beauvais v. D. C. Hall Transport, Incorporated,25 presented
an appeal by the defendants from a judgment awarding the
plaintiffs damages for personal injuries, but rejecting their claims
for property damages. The plaintiffs answered the appeal pray-
ing that the award for personal injuries be increased to the
amount claimed and that the claim for property damage be
allowed. Since all the damages asserted arose out of the same
circumstances, and since part of these was for personal injury,
the court properly declined to entertain jurisdiction, and trans-
ferred the case to the court of appeal.
26
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
W. T. Burton Company v. Stevens Company27 reaffirms the
established principle that after an appeal has been perfected by
the filing of the appeal bond, the failure to file the transcript on
time amounts to an abandonment of the appeal. 28 However, there
22. 47 So. 2d 334 (La. 1950).
23. 47 So. 2d 670 (1950).
24. McCaleb, J., concurring in the Breland case, however, denies that the
constitutional provision vesting the court with jurisdiction when the amount
in dispute exceeds $2000 is applicable, and vigorously points out that the case
merely presented the prosecution of a justiceable right incapable of monetary
appraisal.
25. 217 La. 388, 46 So. 2d 307 (1950).
26. Accord: Sib]ey v. Petty Realty Co., 215 La. 597, 41 So. 2d 230 (1949).
Kirkwood v. McFarland, 217 La. 386, 46 So. 2d 307 (1950), in which the appeals
were also transferred to the intermediate appellate court under similar
circumstances.
27. 216 La. 1090, 45 So. 2d 634 (1950).
28. In Hamilton v. Dabbs, 216 La. 867, 44 So. 2d 896 (1950), it was properly
held that if a suspensive appeal has been abandoned by the failure to lodge
[VOL. XI
1951] WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
seems to be considerable confusion in determining just what
constitutes a timely filing of the record in the appellate court.
Article 833 of the Code of Practice has been interpreted as giving
the appellant three days of grace, after the return day, in which
to file the transcript or apply for an additional time to do so.
Whether these three days are ordinary calendar days, legal, or
judicial days has been the subject of recent litigation. In State
ex rel. Marcade v. City of New Orleans,29 it was held that the
three days of grace provided for in the code were calendar days
and not judicial days. 30 It was further held that these three days
included Sundays and legal holidays, so that where the return
day fell on Friday, the last day within which to lodge the tran-
script or apply for an extension of time was the Monday imme-
diately following, even though the intervening Saturday and
Sunday were legal holidays. The court recognized the estab-
lished principle that if a statute allows a period of time within
which to do a certain act, and such period is more than a week,
intervening Sundays and holidays are computed, but where the
period is less than a week, Sundays and legal holidays are not
counted. The court reasoned, however, that since the original
the transcript timely, the appellant cannot afterwards take a devolutive
appeal from the same judgment. Cf. Vacuum Oil Co. v. Cockrell, 177 La. 623,
148 So. 898 (1933), to the effect that where a suspensive appeal has not been
perfected, the appellant may properly apply for and obtain, within one year
from the judgment, an order for a devolutive appeal. See also Redmond v.
Mann, 24 La. Ann 149 (1872), holding that where the appeal bond is not filed
in time and the appeal is dismissed on that ground, the appellant cannot
thereafter renew his appeal.
29. 216 La. 587, 44 So. 2d 305 (1949).
30. In holding that the three days were calendar days as distinguished
from judicial days (days on which the court is in session) or legal days
(days on which legal and judicial business may be transacted), the court
relied on two prior decisions wherein the problem seems to have been dis-
cussed at length. See Brooks v. Smith, 118 La. 758, 43 So. 399 (1907), and
Keplinger v. Barrow, 132 La. 244, 61 So. 217 (1913). The theory of these cases
was that La. Acts 92 of 1900 and 106 of 1908 (La. R.S. [1950] 13:4438), which
required the fixing of a definite day for the filing of the transcript in the
supreme court, whether in term time or vacation, impliedly repealed the pro-
visions of La. Act 54 of 1870 (E.S.) providing that if the court was not in
session on the return day, the appellant had three judicial days after the
court reconvened within which to file the transcript. These decisions appear
to be sound, since under the factual situations there involved, it was necessary
to determine the validity of Act 54 of 1870. But see Martin Lumber Co. v.
Mullin, 173 La: 389, 137 So. 72 (1931); Holz v. Fishel, 40 La. Ann. 294, 3 So. 888
(1888); Lopes v. Sahuque, 114 La. 1005, 38 So. 810 (1905). In the Lopes case,
the court very tersely points out that the 1870 statute was designed merely
to take care of the situation where the court was not in session at the time
the appeal was made returnable, and that it did not otherwise change the
long established practice that in term time, the appellant had three judicial
days of grace within which to file his transcript. If this is true, it follows
that the implied repeal of the 1870 statute by the acts of 1900 and 1908 should
not have affected the practice, and that the three days spoken of in Article
883 of the Code of Practice might very well be judicial days.
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period of time for filing the transcript was fixed by law at not
less than fifteen days, and that since the three days of grace were
merely an extension of this time, the intervening Saturday and
Sunday should be counted in the computation. Pretermitting the
question as to whether the three days of grace are calendar, judi-
cial, or legal days, 3 1 and adopting the majority rule holding that
they are calendar days, it is difficult to conceive that the three
days are an extension of the original period allowed, so as to
include Sundays and legal holidays in the computation. It must
be noted that, strictly speaking, Article 883 of the Code of Prac-
tice is conditional in that it makes it discretionary with the court
whether the motion for a further delay applied for within the
three days of grace will be granted.3 2 In other words, the appel-
lant must file the transcript on the return day. Thereafter, he
has three days within which to apply for further delay which
may or may not be granted. If the motion for an extension is
denied, can it be said that the original return day has been never-
theless extended to the last day on which the motion may be
made? Moreover, another long established rule of practice in
pari materia is to the effect that a motion to dismiss an appeal
based on irregularities in the order or in the appeal bond must
be filed within three days after the return day in order to be
effective; and in Elliot v. Heard,3 3 the court recently took occasion
31. The vigorous dissent of Moise, J., leaves considerable doubt as to the
correctness of the majority opinion. A closer examination of the authorities
relied on by the court indicates their inapplicability to the factual issues
presented in the principal case. In the Brooks case, the appeal was return-
able on August 15 and extended to September 15, 1906. The transcript was
filed on September 20. The appellants contended that since the appeal was
returnable during the vacation of the court, the filing of the transcript on the
first day of the next term was timely. In the Keplinger case, the appeal was
returnable on December 17, and the transcript was filed on December 22. The
appellants, in opposition to a motion to dismiss, took the position that since
the court did not sit during the week following December 17, they had three
judicial days after the first session following to file the transcript.
Conceivably, a judicial day may also be a legal day. So that what the
court may have had in mind in the Lopes case when it said that the act of
1870 did not affect the established practice of granting three judicial days
when the appeal was returnable in term time may very well have been legal
days (exclusive of Sundays and legal holidays) during which the court is not
officially on vacation.
32. Art. 883, La. Code of Practice of 1870. "If the appellant has not filed
[the transcript] on the day appointed by the inferior judge . . .and was
prevented from doing so by any event not under his control, he may... apply
to the court before the expiration of three days ... and may demand a further
time ... which may be granted by the court if the event causing the delay be
proved to its satisfaction . . ." See also Rule III of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, as amended April 4, 1939, 191 La. xxxix, providing in part as fol-
lows: "A motion for an extension of time for filing a transcript shall state
specifically the cause which prevents the completion of the transcript.
33. 217 La. 218, 46 So. 2d 249 (1950).
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to stress that these three days are legal days, that is, exclusive of
Sundays and legal holidays. It is difficult to reconcile these two
decisions, particularly in view of the trend to liberalize appeals,
for whereas an appellant is unduly restricted as to the time
within which he may file the transcript, the appellee enjoys the
further delay that may be caused by intervening legal holidays.
As a further argument in favor of regarding the three days as a
separate delay is the fact that the appellee may proceed to exe-
cute the judgment if the appellant has not obtained a further
delay and has failed to file the transcript "oh the day directed by
the court below,"3 4 which execution, however, may be enjoined
by the appellant if, at the time of filing his motion for an exten-
sion of time, "the appellee has already required of the clerk the
certificate necessary for the pursuit of such execution."3 5
Far from being settled, the question is apparently still open
in view of what was subsequently said in Hamilton v. Dabbs,
that the three days of grace provided for in Article 883 of the
Code of Practice are judicial days.30
Another interesting point involving appellate procedure was
presented in Succession of Tullier,37 wherein a suspensive appeal
was taken from a judgment refusing to appoint an administrator
on the ground that an administration was not necessary. The
appellees moved to have the appeal dismissed insofar as it was
suspensive, and to have it declared devolutive. They relied prin-
cipally on the case of Succession of Wintz,38 in which it had been
held that a judgment refusing to appoint an administrator can
only be appealed devolutively. The court pointed out, however,
that the only exceptions to the rule that an appeal taken within
the ten days from the rendition of the judgment will stay execu-
ion are those contained in the articles of the Code of Practice,3 9
and that the exception made in the Wintz case was unauthorized. 40
In Angellette v. Hardie,41 the court reaffirms the rule that an
appeal from an interlocutory judgment is permitted only where
irreparable injury may be done. The court could also, in the
34. Art. 884, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
35. Art. 883, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
36. "The established jurisprudence of this court is that where a suspensive
appeal has been abandoned by a failure to file the transcript within three
judicial days after the return day... the appellant cannot afterwards take a
devolutive appeal." Hamilton v. Dabbs, 216 La. 867, 868, 44 So. 2d 896 (1950).
37. 216 La. 821, 44 So. 2d 880 (1950).
38. 111 La. 40, 35 So. 377 (1902).
39. Arts. 580, 1059, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
40. See Succession of Tyler, 192 La. 365, 188 So. 31 (1939).
41. 216 La. 461, 43 So. 2d 794 (1949).
1951]
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same manner, have disposed of the issues presented in In re
Canal Bank and Trust Company,42 where an appeal was taken
from a judgment denying an accounting. In that case, the court
denied the plaintiffs' rule on the executor of the bank in liquida-
tion to file an accounting prior to distributing the assets. The
court held inter alia, however, that since the judgment was the
only judgment rendered in the case, it was, for all intents and
purposes, a final judgment from which a direct appeal could be
taken.
In Irwin v. Irwin,43 the court pointed out that the motion to
remand on grounds of newly discovered evidence authorized by
Article 906 of the Code of Practice is premature when filed prior
to the hearing on appeal. The reason for this is that before the
case can be remanded, the appellate court must first determine
whether a final judgment can be rendered "in the state in which
it is," and this cannot be done without hearing the appeal.
REHEARING
In Antoine v. Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft Corporation,44
the question was again raised as to whether the constitutional
provision requiring that notice of all judgments rendered by the
courts of appeal be given to the counsel of record as a prerequisite
to their finality,45 was applicable to the Court of Appeal for the
Parish of Orleans. Act 16 of 191046 provided that judgments ren-
dered in the courts of appeal become final and executory on the
fifteenth calendar day after rendition, provided that in the interim
an application for a rehearing could be filed.4 7 In the Antoine
case, the relator filed an application for rehearing on the fifteenth
calendar day after the judgment had been rendered,48 and con-
tended that since, under the constitutional provision, notice of
the judgment was required and had not been given, his applica-
tion was timely. The supreme court reviewed the constitutional
42. 216 La. 410, 43 So. 2d 777 (1949).
43. 216 La. 71, 43 So. 2d 221 (1949).
44. 217 La. 251, 46 So. 2d 260 (1950).
45. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 24. "... Notice of all judgments shall
be given to the counsel of record; and the court shall provide by rule for the
giving of such notices. No delays shall run until such notice shall have been
given.
46. La. R.S. (1950) 13:446.
47. The statute also provided that judgments appealed from :the city
courts of New Orleans became final on the sixth calendar day after rendition.
48. The wording of this statute was a trap for the unwary, for it was
generally assumed that the application could be timely filed on the fifteenth
and sixth day, respectively, after rendition of the judgment on appeal. The
possibility of this error has now been eliminated by the Revision of 1950. Cf.
La. R.S. (1950) 13:4446.
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and statutory provisions and properly concluded that they were
applicable exclusively to the courts of appeal for the first and
second circuits, and held that since under the provision of the
act of 1910, the judgment became final on the fifteenth calendar
day, the application should have been filed on or before the four-
teenth day.49
MISCELLANEOUS
In a sequel to Rhodes v. Collier,5" the court announced the
rule that the possession required to maintain an action of jactita-
tion is no different from that required for the possessory action,
and consequently could not be defeated by the mere unauthorized
trespasses of a defendant claiming possession without any color
of title. 51
Arnold v. Arnold5 2 reaffirmed the well-settled principle that
an appeal taken after a year from the judgment is absolutely
null. And in Kennedy v. Perry Timber Company,53 the court
pointed out that under the provisions of Act 112 of 1916 as
amended,14 the adequacy of the appeal bond is to be tested in
the court of original jurisdiction and not by the appellate court.
In Kelly v. Ozone Tung Cooperative,55 the three plaintiffs in
the suit appealed praying for an increase in the award. The court
of appeal affirmied the judgment as to two of the appellants but
reversed it as to the third, who duly applied for a rehearing
praying that the judgment as to him be reinstated. His reasons
were that he had not perfected his appeal because he had not
signed the appeal bond, and that consequently the judgment in
his favor rendered below had become final. Exercising its
supervisory jurisdiction, the supreme court said that the action
of the court of appeal in refusing the rehearing was proper,56
49. See Lacaze v. Hardee, 199 La. 566, 6 So. 2d 663 (1942), holding that in
the first and second circuits, the fourteen days delay for applying for a
rehearing begins to run the day after notice of the judgment is received by
counsel.
50. 215 La. 754, 41 So. 2d 669 (1949), noted in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1948-1949 Term, 10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 120, 250
(1950).
51. Marks v. Collier, 216 La. 1, 43 So. 2d 16 (1949).
52. 217 La. 362, 46 So. 2d 298 (1950).
53. 217 La. 401, 46 So. 2d 312 (1950).
54. La. R.S. (1950) 13:4572.
55. 216 La. 778, 44 So. 2d 865 (1950).
56. It was also pointed out that the appellant had argued his point on
appeal and lost, and that since the appellee could not have urged the irregu-
larity, the appellant himself was precluded from doing so. Cf. Lewis v.
Burglass, 186 La. 36, 171 So. 564 (1936), and Lagraize v. Tracy, 211 La. 765,
30 So. 2d 828 (1947), to the effect that an appellee may, by his actions, be
1951]
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holding that where the appeal bond is signed by two of three
appellants from the same judgment, the failure of the third to
sign the bond does not invalidate or affect the validity of the
appeal.57
deemed to have waived his'right to have an appeal dismissed, even where the
appellant has failed to file his transcript on time.
57. Since the appellant is primarily bound for the debt involved, it is not
necessary for him to sign the appeal bond as principal. Maddox v. Butchee,
201 La. 876, 10 So. 2d 687 (1942).
